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Repression Breeds Resistance: The Black Liberation Army and the Radical Legacy of the Black Panther Party*

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Abstract Recent scholarship argues the Black Panther Party (BPP) existed from 1966 to 1982. Many activists and scholars argue that the BPP only existed as a revolutionary organization from 1966 until 1971, in the initial period of its existence. A significant part of the BPP's legacy is the development of and participation in armed resistance in response to a governmental counter-insurgency campaign. As some BPP members committed themselves to involvement in clandestine resistance, this radical response accelerated the development of the armed movement called the Black Liberation Army. The focus of this study is to examine the influence and participation of BPP members and supporters on the revolutionary armed movement, the Black Liberation Army. This study asserts the activity of the radical faction of the BPP through the form of the Black Liberation Army existed just as long as the Oakland-based Panthers, perhaps longer since it has current manifestations.

The Black Panther Party (BPP) was one of the most significant radical movements in American history. As an organized political organization, the BPP existed from 1966 to 1982. Many activists and scholars argue that the BPP only existed as a revolutionary organization from 1966 until 1971, in the initial period of its existence. In this period, the BPP emphasized armed resistance as a primary means of achieving social change. After 1971, historians of the BPP argue the organization dropped its revolutionary, pro-armed resistance agenda to pursue reformist politics.¹ For example, Charles Hopkins' study "The Deradicalization of the Black Panther Party" argues governmental repression was a central factor in the transformation of the organization from radicalism to reformism. Hopkins states "the result of the interaction between the Panthers and the government from 1966 through 1973, was the transformation of the Black Panther Party (BPP) from a black radical organization to a deradicalized social protest group."² While governmental repression led to the ascendancy of

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¹ Angela D. LeBlanc-Ernest, "The Most Qualified Person to Handle the Job: Black Panther Party Women, 1966-1982," in Charles E. Jones (ed.), *The Black Panther Party [Reconsidered]* (Baltimore, Black Classics Press, 1998), p. 305; Ollie Johnson, "Explaining the Demise of the Black Panther Party: The Role of Internal Factors," in Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 407; Kathleen Cleaver, "Back to Africa: The Evolution of the International Section of the Black Panther Party (1969-1972)," in Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

² Charles Hopkins, "The Deradicalization of the Black Panther Party: 1967-1973," PhD dissertation, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, 1978.

a reformist agenda for one faction of the BPP, it was not the only organizational response. Some BPP members committed themselves to involvement in or support of clandestine military resistance that accelerated the development of the armed movement called the Black Liberation Army (BLA).

Some accounts of the Black Liberation Army argue that "[T]he BLA grew out of the B.P.P. and its original founders were members of the Party ..."³ The BLA is often presented as a result of the repression on the BPP and the split within the Panthers.⁴ Other participants in the Black revolutionary movement give a different perspective to the BLA and its relationship to the Panthers. For example, former political prisoner and Black revolutionary *geronimo ji Jaga* suggests the BLA was a movement concept that predated and was broader than the BPP. *Ji Jaga's* perspective is that several Black revolutionary organizations contributed to the ranks of the Black underground which was collectively known as the Black Liberation Army.⁵ Consistent with the view of *ji Jaga*, BPP and BLA member Assata Shakur asserts in her autobiography that:

... the Black Liberation Army was not a centralized, organized group with a common leadership and chain of command. Instead there were various organizations and collectives working together out of various cities, and in some larger cities there were often several groups working independently of each other.⁶

Given the character of the BLA as a movement of autonomous clandestine units, one can understand the different interpretations of its origins and composition. While acknowledging the positions of *ji Jaga* and Shakur, this paper argues the intense repression of the BPP did replenish the ranks of the Black Liberation Army. Since the BPP was the largest revolutionary nationalist organization of the Black liberation movement of the 1960s and 70s, its membership contributed greatly to the BLA. Panther participation in the BLA represented a continuation of the radical legacy of the BPP and was a response to the counter-insurgency strategy to destroy the Party and the Black liberation movement.

The role of the underground and the armed struggle was a critical issue in the split that occurred within the BPP in 1971. In the split, BPP chapters in Los Angeles and New York, the International Section of the Party and other members were expelled by the national hierarchy led by Huey P. Newton. These factions of the BPP all supported armed resistance and viewed themselves, not the national hierarchy, as the sustainers of the revolutionary legacy of the BPP.

The focus of this study is to examine the influence and participation of BPP members and supporters on the revolutionary armed movement, the Black Liberation Army. This aspect of the legacy of the BPP has not been emphasized in previous scholarly studies, an omission reflective of the willingness of scholars and popular accounts of the BPP to narrow its existence to the national

³ Kit Kim Holder, "The History of the Black Panther Party, 1966-1971," PhD dissertation, University of Massachusetts, 1990, p. 317.

⁴ Dhoruba Bin Wahad, "War Within: Prison Interview," in Fletcher *et al.* (eds), *Still Black, Still Strong*, p. 13; Jalil Muntaqim, *On the Black Liberation Army* (Montreal: Anarchist Black Cross, 1997), p. 4; Sundiata Acoli's August 15, 1983 testimony in *United States v. Sekou Odinga et al.*, in *Sundiata Acoli's Brinks Trial Testimony*, a pamphlet published by the Patterson (New Jersey) Black Anarchist Collective, p. 21.

⁵ *geronimo ji Jaga* interview with author (September 14, 1998), Morgan City, LA.

⁶ Assata Shakur, *Assata: An Autobiography* (Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books, 1987), p. 241.

leadership in Oakland. In the introduction of the recently published book, *The Black Panther Party [Reconsidered]*, Charles E. Jones argues that the Oakland-based BPP existed 16 years (1966–1982).⁷ This study asserts the activity of the radical faction of the BPP through the form of the BLA existed just as long as the Oakland-based Panthers, perhaps even longer since it has current manifestations.

Scholarly research on the BLA is a challenging endeavor. Most books that focus on this organization have been journalistic or biographic.⁸ The journalistic texts have primarily relied on police or prosecution records. American newspapers also reported on BLA activities based upon information offered to the media to support police investigations and prosecutions of Black radicals.⁹ The journalistic literature on the BLA is usually written from a perspective which is uncritical of American law enforcement and its counter-insurgency tactics. Since the BLA is a radical clandestine movement, its activities by their very nature are illegal, making it difficult for scholars to interview its members. Facts are often omitted from biographies and BLA statements to protect incarcerated or indicted members of the movement. The nature of the organization also does not provide the researcher with organizational archives. This study will utilize public documents of the BLA and other movement literature, statements and autobiographies from incarcerated BLA members, as well as from former BLA militants and supporters as a balance to police and prosecutor oriented literature and records.

The Black Underground and the Black Freedom Movement

The development of a clandestine insurgent military force has existed in different periods of the Black freedom struggle in North America. The insurrections and attempted uprisings of enslaved Africans utilized secret, conspiratorial organizations. Insurgent Africans certainly could have brought with them a tradition of secret societies (e.g. Egungun, Oro, and Ogboni in Yoruba land, Zangbeto in Dahomey, Poro in Sierra Leone). Conspiratorial networks were established to connect African fugitive communities with those on the plantation

⁷ "Reconsidering Panther History: The Untold Story," in Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 1–2.

⁸ For examples of these *op. cit.*, pp. 1–2, see Robert Daley, *Target Blue: An Insider's View of the N.Y.P.D.* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1973) and John Castellucci, *The Big Dance: The Untold Story of Kathy Boudin and the Terrorist Family that Committed the Brinks Robbery Murders* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1986). Daley was the prosecutor in trials involving Panthers and BLA members. Castellucci was a reporter for the *Rockland Journal News*, a local newspaper in upstate New York. Castellucci covered the trials of BLA members and other revolutionaries in the early 1980s.

⁹ Counter-insurgency campaigns against the BLA were often coordinated by the FBI and local law enforcement. The FBI's use of the media in counter-insurgency campaigns is well documented. For information see Kenneth O'Reilly "Racial Matters": *The FBI's Secret File on Black America* (New York: Free Press, 1989), pp. 198–99, 207, 215, 275. Also see Evelyn Williams, *Inadmissible Evidence: The Story of the African—American Trial Lawyer Who Defended the Black Liberation Army* (New York: Lawrence Hill, 1993), p. 122. Williams, the attorney for BLA member Assata Shakur and other Black revolutionaries describes the *New York Daily News* as the "primary media agents" for the FBI's counter-insurgency efforts against the BLA in New York area trials. In the 1970s the *Daily News* often published prosecution oriented features concerning the BLA.

with the objective of creating a general uprising. Northern Blacks also created secret societies to aid the escape of fugitives and to plan for general insurrection.

In 1919, the African Blood Brotherhood (ABB) emerged as a radical Black secret society in American urban centers. The ABB advocated that Black people "organize in trade unions, build cooperatively owned businesses, and create paramilitary self-defense units."¹⁰ The ABB dissolved as an organization in the late 1920s as its members decided to become the Black cadre of the American Communist Party.

In the 1950s and 1960s, in several southern towns and rural locations, armed clandestine networks protected civil rights activists and activities, retaliated in response to acts of White supremacist violence and served as an accountability force within the Black community during economic boycotts of White owned business districts.¹¹ The secretive, paramilitary Deacons for Defense and Justice, considered by many to be the armed wing of the southern Civil Rights Movement from 1965 through 1969, never identified the majority of its membership or revealed the size of its organization. Deacons selectively recruited and its members understood that revealing organizational secrets could result in death.¹² In 1969, activists in the southern movement formed a clandestine paramilitary organization to retaliate against White supremacists who committed heinous acts of violence on southern Blacks.

The early 1960s saw the emergence of the Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) as a radical clandestine organization within the Black liberation movement. RAM was initiated in 1962 by northern Black radicals who defined themselves as "revolutionary Black nationalists" seeking to organize an armed struggle to win national liberation for the "colonized Black nation" in the USA.¹³ In 1963, due to political repression, RAM cadre decided to "go underground." In 1964, RAM members involved in SNCC projects in the Mississippi delta worked with SNCC field staff to develop armed self-defense units to defend the project. In the Spring of 1964, RAM chairman Robert Williams, who was a political exile in Cuba, published an article titled "The USA: The Potential for a Minority Revolt." Williams stated that in order to be free, Black people "must prepare to wage an urban guerilla war."¹⁴ During the fall of the same year, RAM organizers presented a 12-point program to Black youth at a National Afro-American Student Conference in Nashville, Tennessee, including "development of Liberation Army (Guerilla Youth Force)."¹⁵ RAM cadre were active in urban

¹⁰ Theodore G. Vincent, *Voices of the Black Nation* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 1991), p. 123.

¹¹ For more information, see Akinyele Umoja, "Eye for an Eye: the Role of Armed Resistance in the Mississippi Freedom Movement," PhD dissertation, Emory University, 1996.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 202-04.

¹³ Robert Brisbane, *Black Activism: Racial Revolution in the United States 1954-1970* (Valley Forge, PA: Judson Press, 1974), p. 182.

¹⁴ Robert Williams quoted in Robert Earl Cohen, *Black Crusader: A Biography of Robert Franklin Williams* (Secaucus, NJ: Lyle Stuart, 1972), pp. 271-72. "USA: The Potential of a Minority Revolt" originally appeared in the May-June issue of Williams' newsletter *The Crusader*.

¹⁵ Maxwell C. Stanford, "Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), a Case Study of a Urban Revolutionary Movement in Western Capitalist Society," Masters thesis, Atlanta University, Atlanta, 1986, p. 99.

guerilla warfare during the urban uprisings occurring from 1965 through 1968.¹⁶ In his work *Black Activism*, Black political scientist Robert Brisbane stated that RAM's objective was "to build a black liberation army consisting of local and regional groups held together under a tight chain of command."¹⁷ In 1967, RAM began to organize Black urban youth into a paramilitary force called the Black Guards. A RAM document, titled "On Organization of Ghetto Youth," projected developing the Black Liberation Army: "... in the early stages of the mobilization of Black ghetto youth we must prepare for the ultimate stage, a protracted war of national liberation; therefore the type of organization that must be established is a paramilitary organization."¹⁸ This document referred to the paramilitary organization as the Black Liberation Army or BLA.¹⁹ Due to intensive federal and state counter-insurgency campaigns, in 1968 RAM decided to disband the organization and function under other names, including the Black Liberation Party, Afrikan Peoples Party and the House of Umoja.

The above mentioned efforts preceded the 1971 split within the Black Panther Party and the subsequent identification of the BLA by state and federal police. While often omitted from the historiography of the Black freedom movement, the concept of armed struggle and a Black underground has a long history and is a legacy that would influence the early development of the Black Panther Party.

The Black Panther Party and the Black Underground

The question of the underground was a principal issue for the Black Panther Party from its inception. Prior to founding the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense with Huey Newton, Bobby Seale was a member of the Revolutionary Action Movement. Seale differed with RAM's insistence on the revolutionary vanguard being clandestine. RAM preferred primarily to interact with the public through mass front organizations. RAM structure, membership, meetings and other activities were secret.

While Seale and Newton differed with RAM's clandestine posture, the BPP organized an underground from its earliest days. By developing an underground wing the BPP leadership prepared for the possibility that its political activities would not be allowed to function in the public arena. In this context, the BPP envisioned a clandestine guerilla force that would serve as the vanguard of the revolution. In 1968, Newton stated:

When the people learn that it is no longer advantageous for them to resist by going into the streets in large numbers, and when they see the advantage in the activities of the guerilla warfare method, they will quickly follow this example ... When the vanguard group destroys the machinery of the oppressor by dealing with him in small groups of three and four, and then escapes the might

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 67-68.

¹⁷ Brisbane, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

¹⁸ Revolutionary Action Movement, "On Organization of Black Ghetto Youth," in Hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations United States Senate, Ninety-First Congress, First Session, Riots, Civil, and Criminal Disorders, June 26 and 30, 1969, Part 20 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 4221-24.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

of the oppressor, the masses will be overjoyed and will adhere to this correct strategy.²⁰

The Panther underground was not openly referred to or publicly acknowledged. The underground apparatus of the BPP was decentralized with autonomous cells in different cities that were referred to by different names at different times. Some large cities contained several autonomous units. These underground units were all part of a movement concept called the Black Liberation Army (BLA). The BLA was broader than the BPP, representing the underground military forces of the revolutionary nationalist Black movement.²¹ By 1968, the official rules of the BPP stated "[N]o party member can join any other army force other than the Black Liberation Army."²² Besides serving the function as an urban guerilla force, the Panther underground included an underground railroad to conceal comrades being sought by Federal and state police. Clandestine medical units were also developed to provide care to BLA soldiers or Panther cadre wounded in combat.²³

The Southern California Chapter of the BPP had an underground almost from its inception. Former Los Angeles gang leader Alprentice "Bunchy" Carter virtually brought a military force into the BPP when he joined in 1967. Carter was the leader of the Renegades, the hardcore of the Slausons. In the early 1960s, the 5000 strong Slausons were the largest street force in Los Angeles. The same social forces (e.g. the desegregation struggle in the South, African independence and other anti-colonial struggles, etc.) that were politicizing tens of thousands in their generation began to radicalize members of the Slausons, including Carter. Many of the Slausons and other street force organizations engaged in guerilla attacks on police and national guard during the Watts uprising of 1965. While incarcerated in the 1960s, Carter joined the Nation of Islam, and was deeply influenced by former prisoner turned revolutionary Malcolm X. In Soledad state prison in California, Carter met the radical intellectual inmate Eldridge Cleaver, who taught Soledad's African American History and Culture class. His associations and the changing political and cultural climate motivated Carter to adopt a revolutionary nationalist ideology. In Soledad, Cleaver and Carter made plans to form a revolutionary nationalist organization, including an underground military wing. Upon leaving prison, Bunchy Carter worked to transform loyal members of his street organizations, ex-inmates, and other Los Angeles street gangs from the gangster mentality to revolutionary consciousness. In late 1967, when Carter joined the BPP, he was also able to contribute an autonomous collective of radicalized street forces organized after leaving incarceration.²⁴

In his role as Southern California Minister of Defense, Carter made it his responsibility to organize an underground Panther cadre. Carter's most trusted

²⁰ Huey Newton, "The Correct Handling of a Revolution," in Philip Foner (ed.), *The Black Panthers Speak* (New York: Da Capo Press, 1995), pp. 41-42.

²¹ ji Jaga interview with author.

²² Louis G. Heath, *Off the Pigs! The History and Literature of the Black Panther Party* (Metuchen, NJ: The Scarecrow Press, 1976), p. 46; "Rules of the Black Panther Party," in Foner, p. 5.

²³ geronimo ji Jaga, "A Soldier's Story," interview by Bakari Kitwana, *The Source* (February 1998), p. 132.

²⁴ *Ibid.*; ji Jaga interview with author; Earl Anthony, *Picking Up the Gun: A Report on the Black Panthers* (New York: Dial Press, 1970), pp. 66-67.

comrades formed the Southern California Panther underground, often referred to as the "Wolves." The true identities and activities of the Wolves were not revealed to aboveground rank-and-file Panthers. Carter's Wolves carried out secret operations to support the work of the BPP in Los Angeles.²⁵

Probably the most significant recruit Bunchy Carter made to the BPP underground was Geronimo Ji Jaga (then known as Geronimo Pratt). Ji Jaga, an ex-US military special forces commando and Vietnam war veteran, was sent to Los Angeles to work with Bunchy Carter by a relative who had become acquainted with Carter's effort to build a Black freedom organization in Los Angeles. While not becoming an official BPP member, Ji Jaga's military skills became a valuable asset in assisting Carter in developing the LA BPP underground. After Carter was murdered in an FBI-provoked clash between the BPP and the US organization on the campus of UCLA in 1969, Ji Jaga assumed Carter's position as Southern California Minister of Defense. With national Minister of Defense Huey Newton incarcerated at this time, the national responsibility of organizing the military wing of the BPP also fell upon the shoulders of Ji Jaga. Ji Jaga saw it as his responsibility to utilize his military skills to develop the Panther underground and to build a cooperative relationship with other clandestine military forces in the Black liberation movement under the banner of the Black Liberation Army.²⁶

After the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. in 1968, the BPP grew rapidly. The organization was transformed from a California-based organization to a national movement with chapters in most American urban centers with a significant number of Black people. By 1969, the BPP had "approximately five thousand members in forty chapters."²⁷ In his role as acting Minister of Defense, Ji Jaga helped to develop new chapters of the organization in places like Atlanta, Dallas, New Orleans, Memphis and Winston Salem (North Carolina) among others. Along with aboveground units of the organization, Ji Jaga played a significant role in developing the underground apparatus of the BPP nationally. Besides initiating new chapters, he visited existing Party chapters to offer his expertise in establishing their clandestine cadre.²⁸

One of the most significant chapters of the BPP to join after the rapid expansion of the BPP in 1968 was in New York City. As in Los Angeles, a clandestine force was established in the New York BPP virtually from its inception. By 1969, a New York police officer reported at federal congressional hearings that "(M)embers of the Black Panthers are not secret, with the exception of those who have been designated as 'underground.' This group are secret revolutionaries, and their identities are kept secret."²⁹

One influence on the development of the Panther underground in New York was the Revolutionary Action Movement. After the assassination of Malcolm X, RAM played a significant role in promoting a revolutionary nationalist program

²⁵ Ji Jaga interview with author.

²⁶ Ji Jaga interview with author; Ji Jaga "A Soldier's Story," p. 132; David Hilliard and Lewis Cole, *This Side of Glory: The Autobiography of David Hilliard and the Story of the Black Panther Party* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), p. 218.

²⁷ Ollie A. Johnson, *op. cit.*, pp. 391-93.

²⁸ Ji Jaga, "A Soldier's Story," p. 132.

²⁹ Testimony of Detective Sgt. Thomas J. Courtney in *Riots, Civil, and Criminal Disorders*, p. 4237.

in New York City. New York Panthers had a cooperative relationship with RAM, unlike the competitive and even antagonistic relations between RAM and Newton and Seale's BPP in Northern California. Some New York City BPP recruits were affiliated with RAM or RAM front organizations prior to becoming Panthers, and many New York BPP cadre were influenced by RAM and Republic of New Afrika leader Herman Ferguson. Ferguson, a New York City educator, served as an inspirational leader and mentor to several New York City youth who eventually joined the BPP and became leaders in the New York chapter. RAM's perspectives on guerilla warfare and underground organization may have influenced the development of a clandestine wing of the New York BPP.

On September 8, 1968, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover designated the BPP as "the greatest threat to the internal security of the country."³⁰ Hoover's pronouncement signaled an intensified counter-insurgency campaign to destroy the BPP. In his study on police repression, Frank Donner classified 1969 as the "year of the Panther." That year alone, police conducted over 13 raids on BPP offices across the United States.³¹ Due to the counter-insurgency campaign waged by the US government on the BPP, Donner states that by the end of 1969 "it was estimated 30 Panthers were facing capital punishment, 40 faced life in prison, 55 faced terms up to thirty years, and another 155 were in jail or being sought."³² In December of 1969, predawn police raids on the BPP in Los Angeles and in Chicago (in which Fred Hampton and Mark Clark were murdered) are distinguished in terms of their impact on the national Black liberation movement.

The increased repression enhanced the importance of *ji Jaga* in the BPP. First, the increased repression made underground organization more necessary. Panthers who faced charges needed refuge in the clandestine network. Those wounded in battles with police often needed care from the underground medical cadre. Geronimo's status as a nationally known BPP leader was also well established after the vigilant defense of the primary office of BPP in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles BPP office, mainly staffed by teenagers, was able to survive a five-hour predawn police attack that included the use of SWAT forces and the detonation of a bomb on the Los Angeles Panther headquarters. While *ji Jaga* was not present during the raid, the preparations and militarily training provided by him were decisive to the survival of his comrades.³³ After the defense of the Los Angeles Panther headquarters, *The Black Panther* hailed *ji Jaga* as the "[E]ssence of a Panther."³⁴

Upon his release from prison in 1970, Huey Newton inherited a national military force that had been primarily developed during his imprisonment. The

³⁰ J. Edgar Hoover quoted in Ward Churchill and Jim Vander Wall, *Agents of Repression: The FBI's Secret Wars Against the Black Panther Party and the American Indian Movement* (Boston: South End Press, 1988), p. 77.

³¹ "Chronology of the Black Panther Party," in Jim Fletcher, Tanaquil Jones and Sylvere Lotringer (eds), *Still Black, Still Strong: Survivors of the War Against Black Revolutionaries* (New York: Semiotext, 1993), pp. 229-33.

³² *Protectors of Privilege: Red Squads and Police Repression in Urban America* (Berkeley: University of California, 1990), p. 180.

³³ "Chronology of the Black Panther Party," p. 233; K. N. Cleaver, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

³⁴ Craig Williams, "Reflections of Geronimo: The Essence of a Panther," *The Black Panther* (August 29, 1970), p. 14.

military development of the BPP paralleled the tremendous increase in the size of the membership, the transition from a local organization to a national movement, and the recent national and international status of the BPP since the arrest and incarceration of Newton in October of 1967. While the BPP always envisioned an underground military wing to complement its underground activities, Newton was uncomfortable with the military development of the BPP. The rapidly expanded clandestine military wing of the BPP had been primarily organized by ji Jaga. While ji Jaga was trusted by other BPP leaders and rank-and-file cadre throughout North America, Newton became very insecure about his presence. Newton did not trust and was not inclusive of key Panther members he did not know prior to his incarceration in 1967.³⁵ In due time, government operatives and ambitious BPP members convinced Newton that ji Jaga was a threat to his leadership and the Party. While the overwhelming repression of the BPP contributed to Newton's decision to move away from his original positions on armed struggle, his fear of ji Jaga and the developing BPP military apparatus must also be taken into consideration. Significantly, the cleavage between Newton and the BPP military played a central role in what has come to be known as the split in the Black Panther Party.³⁶

The Panther Split and the Black Liberation Army

The question of armed struggle and the role of the underground were critical in the BPP split of 1971. It is an acknowledged fact that the "divide and conquer" tactics of the FBI were central to the division within the leadership and rank and file of the Party. The FBI and other government counter-insurgency forces played on internal tensions and developing ideological differences to encourage the BPP split. The influence of counter-insurgency efforts must be taken into account when examining the ideological differences in the BPP. Operatives were instructed to manipulate ideological differences and exploit insecurities within the organization. These counter-insurgency efforts created an environment which made resolving internal contradictions within the BPP virtually impossible.

The major ideological difference was over the question of armed struggle. Newton and Party Chief of Staff David Hilliard were perceived by radical forces in the Party as moving away from their original support for the development of an armed clandestine vanguard at the very moment repression was forcing members of the Party underground. As early as 1969, the national leadership had initiated a policy to expel those members involved in "unauthorized" military and clandestine activity.³⁷ Simultaneously, the increased political repression of the Black liberation movement and particularly the BPP convinced many it was time to develop the underground vanguard. In the face of intense counter-insurgency campaign and court cases, many Panthers concluded it was better to struggle from clandestinity than spend years incarcerated. Panthers'

³⁵ Huey Newton quoted in Holder, *op. cit.*, p. 257. One exception to this was Elaine Brown, who moved up the ranks up the BPP to the inner circle of the national leadership.

³⁶ Hilliard, *op. cit.*, pp. 299-300, 304-12; ji Jaga interview with author; Churchill and Vander Wall, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

³⁷ Kit Kim Holder, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-56.

lack of trust in receiving justice in American courts was well founded. In 1970, even Yale University president Kingman Brewster publicly questioned "the ability of Black revolutionaries to achieve a fair trial anywhere in the United States."³⁸ Due to the new policy of the BPP national hierarchy against clandestine activity, Panthers going underground to avoid state repression were placed in a precarious position.

The BPP split was the result of a series of "purges" of collectives and groups within the BPP culminating with the expulsion of leading Central Committee members by Huey Newton. The turning point was the expulsion of Geronimo ji Jaga. In August of 1970, ji Jaga had gone underground to further develop the BLA. Based upon his assessment of the counter-insurgency assault on the Black liberation movement, ji Jaga concluded that the "establishment of guerilla bases" was "an integral necessary part of the overall freedom movement." His strategy was to strengthen the revolutionary nationalist clandestine network in urban and rural areas throughout the United States, particularly in the historic Black belt in the southeast.³⁹ Ji Jaga and his comrades Will Stanford, Will "Crutch" Holiday, and George Lloyd were arrested in Dallas, Texas on December 8, 1970. At another location in Dallas later the same day, BPP member Melvin "Cotton" Smith (later identified as a police informant) was also arrested. Smith had been sent to Dallas by Huey Newton and Elaine Brown to meet with ji Jaga. After the arrests, Newton was encouraged by members of his inner circle who were opposed to ji Jaga's influence and secret operatives of governmental counter-insurgency campaigns to expel ji Jaga. In January of 1971, Newton publicly denounced Ji Jaga and his wife Nsondi ji Jaga (Sandra Pratt), and their comrades and co-defendants Stanford, Holiday, and Lloyd for exhibiting "counter-revolutionary behavior." A directive carrying Newton's name but written by Brown (at that time part of Newton's inner circle) stated: "Any Party member who attempts to aid them or communicate with them in any form or manner shall help to undermine and destroy the Black Panther Party." Newton's directive also implied ji Jaga was a government operative loyal to the CIA. Referring to ji Jaga's involvement in the US Army's Special Forces prior to joining the Panthers, the Oakland BPP's leader concluded "he is as dedicated to that Pig Agency as he was in Vietnam."⁴⁰ Needless to say, this attack caused major division and confusion in the BPP.

During the weeks following the suspension of ji Jaga, tensions increased between the New York chapter of the BPP and Newton and his followers, in part because of an intensive counter-insurgency campaign by the FBI. The tensions became public after an open letter from incarcerated leaders and members of the New York chapter (a.k.a. the Panther 21) to the Weather Underground, a White American left clandestine organization. The "Weathermen" had engaged in bombing of political targets primarily concerning the Vietnam War and had officially recognized the BPP as the vanguard of the revolution in North America. The Panther 21 letter proclaimed the Weathermen as part of the

³⁸ Kenneth O'Reilly, *Racial Matters: The FBI's Secret File on Black America* (New York: Free Press, 1989), p. 320.

³⁹ Geronimo Pratt (ji Jaga), "The New Urban Guerilla," in *Humanity, Freedom, Peace* (Los Angeles: Revolutionary Peoples Communication, 1972), p. 26.

⁴⁰ Huey Newton, "On the Expulsion of Geronimo from the Black Panther Party," *The Black Panther* (January 23, 1971), p. 7.

vanguard of the revolutionary movement inside the United States while criticizing the national leadership of the BPP. In their letter of support to the Weather Underground, the Panther 21 stated:

... [w]e feel an unrighteous act has been done to you by the self proclaimed 'vanguard' parties by their obvious neglect in not openly supporting you ... But they have ignored us also ... these 'omnipotent' parties are throwing seeds of confusion, escapism, and have lost much of their momentum by bad tactics ...⁴¹

The Panther 21 sentiments reflected the views of many members who believed it was necessary to respond to state repression by strengthening the armed clandestine capacity of the BPP, not abandoning it. The incarcerated New York Panthers called for an underground guerilla offensive because "... racism, colonialism, sexism and all other pig 'isms' ... can only be ended by revolution ... ARMED STRUGGLE ..."⁴² They believed the Weather Underground was going in the direction in which the BPP should be going. For their open letter, the Panther 21 were expelled by the national leadership.⁴³ Remaining Panthers struggled to maintain peace in the BPP and negotiate between the national leadership in Oakland and the New York 21. Recognizing the confusion created by the expulsions of ji Jaga and the New York 21, the FBI determined to "more fully exploit" the ideological and factional differences in the BPP. On January 28, 1971, FBI offices in Boston, New York, San Francisco and Los Angeles received the following message from headquarters:

The present chaotic situation within the BPP must be exploited and receipts must maintain a high level of counter-intelligence activity. You should each give this matter high priority attention and immediately furnish the Bureau recommendations ... designated to further aggravate the dissension within BPP leadership.⁴⁴

It is important to note that the inability of BPP leadership to understand their ideological difference were magnified through the "divide and conquer" tactics of a counter-insurgency campaign which manipulated the insecurities of key Panther leaders.

On February 13, 1971, New York Panthers Michael Tabor and Dhoruba Bin Wahad (a.k.a. Richard Moore) and Newton's personal secretary Connie Matthews were expelled after they went underground. Later that month, Panthers from northeastern chapters called a press conference in Harlem calling for the expulsion of Newton and Hilliard. The "East Coast" Panthers recognized BPP national leaders Eldridge Cleaver, Kathleen Cleaver, Donald Cox, and Bobby Seale as the legitimate national leadership of the BPP. At the time, the Cleavers and Cox were political exiles in Algeria and Seale was incarcerated in Connecticut. New York would become the headquarters for this faction of the BPP.⁴⁵ After the split, the "East Coast" Black Panther Party became the above-

⁴¹ "Open Letter to Weather Underground from Panther 21," *East Village Other*, 8 (January 19, 1971), p. 3.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 20.

⁴³ Rod Such, "Newton Expels Panthers," *Guardian* 20:21 (February 1971), p. 4; E. Tani and Kae Sera, *False Nationalism, False Internationalism* (Chicago: A Seeds Beneath the Snow Publication, 1985), p. 209; Akinyele O. Umoja, "Set Our Warriors Free: The Legacy of the Black Panther Party and Political Prisoners," in Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 421-22.

⁴⁴ FBI memorandum quoted in Huey P. Newton, *War Against the Panthers: A Study of Repression in America* (New York: Harlem River Press, 1996), pp. 67-68.

⁴⁵ Holder, *op. cit.*, pp. 275-77; "A Call to Dissolve the Central Committee," *Right On! Black Community News Service* (April 3, 1971), p. 3.

ground apparatus of BPP members who joined the BLA. From their New York headquarters the "East Coast" BPP put out their newspaper *Right On!*, which became a public organ of the armed movement. Through the *Right On!* newspaper, instructions on guerilla warfare, news about airline hijackings and other military actions were disseminated.

After the expulsions of ji Jaga and key members of the Los Angeles and New York Panthers, exiled BPP members in Algeria entered the fray. One critical objective of the US government's counter-insurgency program was to create a split between Newton and Eldridge Cleaver, head of the International Section of the BPP.⁴⁶ The members of the International Section were deeply concerned about the expulsions of ji Jaga and the Panthers in Los Angeles and New York, believing these actions represented the ascendancy of authoritarian rule by Newton and Hilliard. Particularly after the expulsion of ji Jaga, Cleaver appealed to Newton and Hilliard from Algiers to no avail. The International Section was also concerned with the lack of support for BPP members and supporters engaged in acts of armed resistance.⁴⁷ On February 26, 1971, Newton arranged a telephone conversation with Cleaver on a San Francisco television show. Newton's purpose of arranging this public conversation was to demonstrate the unity of the two most visible BPP leaders, in spite of the expulsions of Los Angeles and New York Panthers. At the end of the televised conversation, Cleaver called for the reinstatement of the expelled Panthers in New York and Los Angeles and the resignation of the BPP Chief of Staff David Hilliard. After the television program, Newton called the BPP International office in Algiers and expelled the entire International Section. Supporting sentiment of expelled Panthers in Los Angeles and New York, the International Section saw the radical elements of the organization as the "true" Black Panther Party. The International Section of the BPP criticized Hilliard and Newton because they had "consciously set about to destroy the underground." Given the repression of the BPP and the Black liberation movement, the exiled Panthers centered in Algeria believed it was "necessary ... to advance the armed struggle ... We need a people's army and the Black Panther vanguard will bring that about."⁴⁸ The International Section and the BPP factions centered in New York and Los Angeles all aligned around a more radical pro-armed struggle position than Newton and the Oakland-based BPP. The radical BPP no longer recognized Newton and the Oakland-based Panthers as a revolutionary organization but as a opportunist rightwing clique, the "Peralta street gang" (after the street where the Newton-led BPP was located in Oakland).⁴⁹

Ignoring his previous position, Newton would blame the influence of Cleaver for the development of pro-armed struggle currents in the BPP. Newton argued that Cleaver's influence overemphasized the "gun" and moved the BPP into military action without the support of the community.⁵⁰ As Newton's

⁴⁶ Newton, *op. cit.*, pp. 65-71.

⁴⁷ K. N. Cleaver, *op. cit.*, pp. 236-39.

⁴⁸ Jack A. Smith, "Panther Rift Aired in Algiers," *Guardian* 23:29 (April 17, 1971), p. 3.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*; Walter "Toure" Pope, *Political Cadre of the Afro-American Liberation Army*, "Writ No. 2: On the Hooligan Right Wing Newton Clique and the Flunkeys," in *Humanity, Freedom, Peace*, *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

⁵⁰ Huey Newton, "On the Defection of Eldridge Cleaver from the Black Panther Party and the Defection of the Black Community," in Philip Foner (ed.), *The Black Panthers Speak*, pp. 272-78.

Oakland-based leadership moved in a more reformist direction, some forces supporting the development of an underground military presence maintained loyalty to the Oakland-based BPP. Within the California prison system, BPP Field Marshall George Jackson attempted to transform incarcerated Black men into revolutionary soldiers. Jackson's published prison letters reveal his desire to develop a clandestine army to defend and complement the activity of the aboveground Black Panther Party under Newton's leadership. The murder of Jackson on August 21, 1971 and the disruption of his recruits by government forces would eliminate this potential clandestine army for the BPP.⁵¹

While not engaging in revolutionary violence, Newton and his cohorts did see the need for a military group. In 1972, the Oakland-based BPP created a security force (a.k.a. "the squad") to protect its leadership. In time Newton would use the security force as his personal "goon squad" to maintain internal discipline and to pressure local enterprises to contribute finances to the BPP. Newton envisioned controlling legal and illegal activity in Oakland. While the BPP became involved in local electoral campaigns, the military elements loyal to Newton struggled for control of drugs and prostitution in Oakland. Increasingly, Newton's squad would be used for intimidation and criminal activity.⁵²

In response to the development of the split within the BPP, US government counter-insurgency operatives employed a "carrot and the stick" strategy in dealing with both factions of the BPP. As the Oakland-based BPP moved in more reformist direction the harassment, government-sponsored military raids, and political internment subsided. Within four years the Oakland-based BPP, then under the leadership of Elaine Brown, would receive federal and foundation funding. In 1976, Brown served as a delegate to the National Democratic Convention.⁵³ Panther members and supporters associated with the radical BPP factions, however, found themselves under greater surveillance and harassment by federal and local police. As a result, the aboveground radical BPP factions were generally reduced to being defense committees for captured BLA comrades or as a support and propaganda mechanism for the underground. By 1975, within four years of the split, the radical factions had no visibly aboveground presence.

Repression of the "East Coast" Panthers and the Black Panther Party

The BLA saw its purpose was to "defend Black people, to fight for Black people, and to organize Black people militarily, so they can defend themselves through a people's army and people's war."⁵⁴ Within the context of the Black community, the BLA waged a campaign to eliminate and sanction internal enemies, including thieves and drug peddlers.⁵⁵ In New York, the BLA initiated a campaign called "Deal with the Dealer" to make it "difficult" and "unhealthy" for drug peddlers to traffic in Black communities. BLA units would identify the "hang outs" of prominent drug merchants and drug processing facilities and raid them.

⁵¹ George Jackson, *Blood in My Eye* (Baltimore: Black Classics Press, 1990), pp. 11-72; Hilliard, *op. cit.*, pp. 379-80.

⁵² Ollie Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 407.

⁵³ Hopkins, *op. cit.*, p. 231.

⁵⁴ Acoli, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

In some cases, drug dealers were physically attacked and even killed. Both Assata Shakur and H. Rap Brown (a.k.a. Jamil Al-Amin) were involved in trials related to Black underground attacks on drug activity in the Black community.⁵⁶

BLA members also waged a "defensive/offensive" campaign against police. Between 1971 and 1973, nearly 1000 Black people were killed by American police.⁵⁷ Of particular concern to the BLA were the murders of Black teenagers and children at the hands of police officers. These killings included 16-year-old Rita Lloyd in New Jersey as well as 11-year-old Rickie Bolden and 10-year-old Clifford Glover in New York City. BLA members saw themselves responding to the defense of an oppressed and colonized people that were victims of a genocidal war. American police were seen as the occupation army of the colonized Black nation and the primary agents of Black genocide. So the BLA believed it had to "defend" Black people and the Black liberation movement in an offensive manner by using retaliatory violence against the agents of genocide in the Black community. In the two years after the BPP split, the US government attributed the deaths of 20 police officers to the Black Liberation Army.⁵⁸

In 1971, the BLA response to police repression and violence was bold and intense. On May 19, 1971 (the 46th birthday of Malcolm X), the BLA claimed responsibility for the shooting of two New York police guarding the home of Frank Hogan, the New York District Attorney in charge of prosecuting the New York Panther 21.⁵⁹ Two days later, two New York police officers were killed in an ambush by BLA members. BLA activity was not confined to New York. In August of 1971, BLA soldiers carried out several actions in San Francisco, including an attack on two San Francisco police stations and one police car which resulted in the death of one police officer and the wounding of several others. These actions and others were in retaliation for the shooting death of incarcerated Black revolutionary and BPP Field Marshall George Jackson on August 21, 1971 and the FBI and Mississippi police raid on the headquarters of the Provisional Government of the Republic of New Afrika on August 18, 1971.⁶⁰ On November 3, 1971, police also suspected the BLA of shooting a police officer in Atlanta, Georgia. On December 21 of the same year, police accused BLA combatants of participation in a grenade attack on a police car in Atlanta, resulting in injuries to two police officers.⁶¹

⁵⁶ Kes Kesu Men Maa Hill, *Notes of a Surviving Black Panther: A Call for Historical Clarity, Emphasis, and Application* (New York: Pan-African Nationalist Press, 1992), p. 71; Dhoruba Bin Wahad, interviewed by Bill Weinberg, "Dhoruba Bin Wahad: Former Panther, Free at Last," *High Times* 241 (September 1995), <<http://www.hightimes.com/ht/mag/959/dhoruba.html>> [Accessed January 12, 1999]; Assata Shakur, *op. cit.*, pp. 162-72; Clayborne Carson, in *Struggle: SNCC and the Black Awakening of the 1960s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 298.

⁵⁷ Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*

⁵⁹ "By Any Means Necessary: Writings of the Black Liberation Army," in *Breakthrough: The Political Journal of the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee* 2:2 (1978), p. 50; United States Justice Department LEAA (Law Enforcement Assistance Act) document quoted in Muntaqim, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁶⁰ "By Any Means Necessary," p. 50; Muntaqim, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

⁶¹ Muntaqim, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

In response to these and other actions claimed by the Black Liberation Army, the FBI initiated new counter-insurgency campaigns. One campaign in particular was "NEWKILL," organized to investigate New York police killings for which the BLA claimed responsibility or were suspected. NEWKILL would signal greater repression on "East Coast" Panthers and their associates, allies, and supporters. In an FBI memorandum concerning NEWKILL, J. Edgar Hoover stated:

The Newkill cases and others terrorist acts have demonstrated that in many instances those involved in these acts are individuals who cannot be identified as members of an extremist group ... They are frequently supporters, community workers, or people who hang around the headquarters of the extremist group or associate with members of the group.⁶²

As part of its campaign against the BLA, the FBI's domestic intelligence division (a.k.a. Division Five) ordered its field officers to detain "East Coast" Panthers and other Black revolutionaries and to document the identities of "supporters and affiliates of these groups with your file numbers on each ... If you have no file, open files."⁶³ The selected targeting of "East Coast" Panthers and affiliated radical organizations and supporters forced even more Black revolutionaries underground.

The FBI and local police also initiated a national "search and destroy" mission for suspected BLA members. FBI and local police collaborated in stakeouts of suspected BLA members. The stakeouts were the products of intensive political repression and counter-intelligence campaigns like NEWKILL. On May 3, 1973, BLA members Zayd Shakur, Sundiata Acoli (a.k.a. Clark Squire), and Assata Shakur (a.k.a. Joanne Chesimard) were stopped by New Jersey police on the New Jersey Turnpike. A shootout ensued and when the smoke cleared, one of the police officers and Zayd Shakur were dead and Assata Shakur was severely wounded. After a "massive manhunt," Acoli was captured days later in New Brunswick, New Jersey.⁶⁴ Police hailed the capture of Assata, calling her the "Black Joan of Arc" and the "high priestess" and "the soul" of the "cop-hating BLA." The FBI, New York and New York Jersey police attempted to tie Assata to every suspected action of the BLA involving a woman.⁶⁵ Shakur and her legal defense were able to win acquittals on all charges for incidents prior to the shootout on the New Jersey Turnpike. Assata and Acoli were both convicted by all-White juries (in separate trials) for the murder of the New Jersey state trooper and of Zayd Shakur. New Jersey judges sentenced both Acoli and Shakur to life plus 30 years. No evidence was ever presented to confirm that Assata ever fired or handled a weapon during the 1973 shootout. Indeed, evidence was presented proving she was shot twice in the back while her hands were up in the air in a position of surrender.⁶⁶

On November 14, 1973, BLA member Twyman Meyers was ambushed by a joint force of FBI agents and New York police in the Bronx. As Meyers was

⁶² J. Edgar Hoover quoted in O'Reilly, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

⁶³ FBI memorandum quoted in O'Reilly, *op. cit.*, p. 321.

⁶⁴ "1 Panther killed, another imprisoned," *Guardian* 25:31 (May 16, 1973), p. 17.

⁶⁵ Michael Kaufman, "Seized Woman Called Black Militants' Soul," *New York Times* (May 3, 1973), p. 47.

⁶⁶ Lennox Hinds, "Forward," in Assata Shakur, *op. cit.*, p. XI.

leaving a Bronx apartment, he was surrounded by dozens of police. Meyers responded with gunfire. A "firefight" ensued between the 23-year-old Black revolutionary and the New York police and FBI. According to witnesses, Meyers ran out of ammunition and was then killed by police.⁶⁷ With the death of Meyers, New York Police Commissioner Donald Cawley announced that the campaign of the FBI and local police had "broken the back" of the Black Liberation Army. Between 1971 and 1973, police claimed responsibility for the deaths of seven suspected BLA members and the capture of 18 others believed to be "key figures in the movement."⁶⁸

Ideology and Consolidation

In the face of the capture and murder of its comrades, the BLA had to reevaluate its position. A BLA communique issued in 1975 details the deaths and capture of BLA combatants from 1971 to 1975.

With the deaths of Woody and Kimu we launched assaults against the police that set them on edge; their counter-attack saw us at the end of 1973 with four dead, over twenty comrades imprisoned in New York alone. In New Orleans, Los Angeles, and Georgia, B.L.A. members were taken prisoner by Federal agents working with local police to crush the B.L.A. 1974 found the guns of the B.L.A. quiet until April, when with so many comrades imprisoned we assaulted the Tombs in an effort to liberate some comrades; the attempt was unsuccessful; and two weeks later found three more comrades captured in Connecticut. While our ranks outside were being diminished, our ranks inside started to grow. Within the prisons themselves comrades launched numerous assaults and attempt escapes on a regular basis. Before 74 was over, another comrade was shot and captured, victim of an informant. Now in the third month of 1975 we have one dead, two captured in Virginia, and another escape attempt in New York.⁶⁹

The above quote was part of an assessment done in 1975 by captured BLA militants titled "Looking Back." In "Looking Back," the BLA reviewed its successes and defeats. Part of their assessment was that "we (the BLA) lacked a strong ideological base and political base." In spite of its losses, BLA members decided to assert themselves as a political force. In the same year, incarcerated BLA members and some of their supporters on the streets attempted to consolidate the ranks of the movement under a central command, the BLA Coordinating Committee (BLA-CC). "Get Organized and Consolidate to Liberate" was among the primary slogans of the BLA-CC. The BLA-CC published and distributed a political document *A Message to the Black Movement* to win support for

⁶⁷ Michael Kaufman, "Slaying of One of the Last Black Liberation Army Leaders Still at Large Ended a 7-Month Manhunt," *New York Times* (November 14, 1973), p. L-10; Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 109; Owadi, "The Saga of Twyman Myers," *New Afrikan Freedom Fighters* 1:1 (June 1982), p. 8.

⁶⁸ Kaufman, "Slaying of BLA Leader."

⁶⁹ BLA communique titled "Looking Back," in "By Any Means Necessary: Writings of the Black Liberation Army," in *Breakthrough: Political Journal of the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee* 2:2 (1978), pp. 56-57. The mention of "Woody" and "Kimu" is referring to Woody Changa Olugbala Green and Anthony Kimu Olugbala White. Both of these men were members of the Olugbala tribe, a unit of the BLA. Green and White were killed in January of 1973 in a shootout with police in Brooklyn, New York.

the concept of armed struggle and expand its political base.⁷⁰ The BLA-CC also began to circulate a newsletter within the penitentiaries and movement circles to create dialogue and ideological unity within the BLA.⁷¹

Some BLA members began to unite with the political objective of the Provisional Government of the Republic of New Afrika. (The RNA was a movement initiated by 500 Black nationalists at the Black Government Conference in Detroit in March of 1968. The participants in this conference declared their independence from the United States government and called for a Black nation-state to be formed in the southern states of Mississippi, Louisiana, Alabama, Georgia and South Carolina. This new nation-state would be called New Afrika.⁷²) The New York branch of the PGRNA and the radical New York chapter of the BPP developed a close working relationship which included selling each other's newspapers and jointly organizing forums and rallies, particularly around the issue of political prisoners.⁷³ Some New York Panthers began to identify themselves as citizens of the Republic of New Afrika and pledged their loyalty to the PGRNA. Captured Black Liberation Army members also began to support the New Afrikan independence movement. In January 1975, two captured BLA members declared they were citizens of the RNA and that American courts had no jurisdiction over them. Their positions and the statements of others represented a clear ideological trend developing within the ranks of BLA fighters.⁷⁴

The adoption of a nationalist perspective by BPP members who joined the BLA should not come as a surprise. Besides the role of the underground and armed struggle, another underlying ideological issue in the BPP split was the issue of nationalism. At its inception, the BPP described its ideology as revolutionary nationalism. The BPP saw people of African descent in the United States as a colonized nation. In 1968, the BPP demanded a United Nations supervised plebiscite to determine the political destiny of the colonized Black nation. One cause of tension between the New York BPP chapter and the national leadership based in Oakland was the issue of nationalism. As noted earlier, the Oakland-based leadership had a history of conflict with nationalist organizations, like RAM, while the New York BPP enjoyed cooperative working relationships with Black nationalists. After leaving prison in 1970, Newton began to distance himself from the plebiscite demand. In his philosophy of intercommunalism, articulated in early 1971, Newton argued that nations and struggles

⁷⁰ Black Liberation Army-Coordinating Committee, *Message to the Black Movement: A Political Statement from the Black Underground Coordinating Committee: the Black Liberation Army*, reprinted in *Dragon-Fire, Newsletter of the National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners* 1:4 (1976), pp. 11-13, 17; Muntaqim, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁷¹ Muntaqim, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁷² Kwame Afoh, Chokwe Lumumba, Imari Obadele and Ahmed Obafemi, *A Brief History of Black Struggle in America* (Baton Rouge: House of Songhay, 1991), pp. 36-37. Consistent with contemporary written alphabets of indigenous African languages, members of the Black nationalist movement often spell "Afrika" with a "k."

⁷³ Ahmed Obafemi, interview with author (December 20, 1996), Birmingham, AL; Chokwe Lumumba, interview with author (December 22, 1996), Jackson, MI.

⁷⁴ Masai Eehosi, interviewed by author (December 28, 1996), Chicago; Safiya Bukari, "Coming of Age: Notes from a New Afrikan Revolutionary," *Afrikan Prisoner of War Journal* 7 (1988), p. 12; Afoh *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

for national self-determination were no longer relevant.⁷⁵ Many Panthers in the New York disagreed with Newton's ideological shift away from Black nationalism.⁷⁶ New York Panther Assata Shakur commented:

Politically, I was not at all happy with the direction of the Party. Huey went on a nation detour advocating his new theory of intercommunality. The essence of his theory was that imperialism had reached a degree that sovereign borders were no longer recognized and the oppressed nations no longer existed, only oppressed communities. The only problem was that somebody forgot to tell oppressed communities that they were no longer nations. Even worse, almost no one understood Huey's long speeches on intercommunalism.⁷⁷

After the split, New York Panthers and Panthers in the BLA maintained their radical nationalist viewpoints. For many BPP and BLA members, support for the objective of an independent Republic of New Afrika was a logical conclusion.

The BLA is not Dead: The Liberation of Assata

On November 2, 1979, members of the BLA conducted an armed action at Clinton Correctional Institution for Women in New Jersey, resulting in the escape of Assata Shakur. Prison authorities described the action as "well planned and arranged."⁷⁸ Three days later on Black Solidarity Day in New York, a demonstration of 5000 marched from Harlem to the United Nations building under the slogan of "Human Rights and Self-Determination for the Black Nation." Hundreds of the marchers carried signs stating "Assata Shakur is Welcome Here." At the rally that day, blocks away from the United Nations building, a statement was read from the BLA:

Comrade—Sister Assata Shakur was freed from racist captivity in anticipation of Black Solidarity Day, November 5th, ... in order to express to the world the need to Free All Black Prisoners is of fundamental importance to protection of Black Human Rights in general ... In freeing Comrade—Sister Assata we have made it clear that such treatment and the criminal "guilt" or innocence of a Black freedom fighter is irrelevant when measured by our people's history of struggle against racist domination.⁷⁹

A statement written by Assata a few days prior to her liberation from Clinton state prison was also circulated at the rally. Assata's statement condemned United States prison conditions and called for freedom for political prisoners, support for human rights and an independent New Afrikan nation-state.⁸⁰ Despite the boasts of the FBI and police of "breaking the back" of the BLA six years prior, the BLA had certainly achieved a victory. One of the most sought

⁷⁵ Huey Newton, "Let Us Hold High the Banner of Intercommunalism," *The Black Panther* (January 23, 1971), pp. B-G.

⁷⁶ Holder, *op. cit.*, p. 273.

⁷⁷ Assata Shakur, pp. 225-56.

⁷⁸ Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

⁷⁹ "To: The Black Community and the Black Movement, Special Communique (Joanne Chesimard), From: Coordinating Committee, B.L.A., Subject Freeing of Sister Assata Shakur on 2 November 79," *Breakthrough: Political Journal of the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee* 4:1 (Winter 1980), p. 12.

⁸⁰ Assata Shakur, "Statement from Assata Shakur," *Breakthrough: Political Journal of the Prairie Fire Organizing Committee* 4:1 (Winter 1980), pp. 13-15.

after and well known members of the BLA escaped captivity through the actions of her comrades. Despite the casualties suffered from 1971 to 1975, the BLA was not dead.

Assata's liberation was hailed by the activist and progressive elements in the national Black community as a heroic event. In December of 1979, the *Amsterdam News*, a New York-based Black owned newspaper, published an article "Run Hard Sister, Run Hard," by Reverend Herbert Daughtry, the leader of the National Black United Front. Daughtry applauded the BLA soldiers who participated in the freeing of their sister comrade. Reverend Daughtry stated:

... [t]hey say three brave brothers and a sister went to fetch Assata from the cold confines ... where she had been held fast against her will ... Who the four were, I do know not. But, every Black person knows them and have met them in the collective unconscious mind of the race. Their heroic deed will be told and retold around a million years to come ... where Black people gather to reminisce about heroes and heroines, great acts of courage and daring acts of courage and daring deeds, their exploits will be remembered.⁸¹

In the January of 1980, supporters of Shakur also placed a half page advertisement in the *Amsterdam News* proclaiming support for the fugitive Black revolutionary. The ad, entitled "Peace to Assata Shakur (a.k.a. Joanne Chesimard)," urged Shakur to "stay strong and free" and offered her moral support.⁸²

The liberation of Assata also led to a renewed campaign of repression by federal and state police agencies. One week after the liberation of Assata, a joint FBI and New York police force raided the home of New York Panther Sekou Hill, a friend of Shakur, who was arrested and held without bond for three weeks. Evidence produced at Hill's bail hearing proved that he was in Brooklyn at the time of Assata's escape. Hill was released and eventually charges were dropped.⁸³

On April 19, 1980, 50 armed federal agents engaged in a predawn raid of an Harlem apartment complex. Police ransacked the homes of residents in an apparent search for Shakur. Without warrants, police forced their way into residences, breaking down doors, detaining residents, and searching through personal items. One resident, Eburn Adelona, a doctoral student at Columbia University, was awakened by police, with guns pointing in her face, and forced into the hallway of the complex. The police "suspected" Adelona was Shakur. In the hallway, federal agents demanded she raise up her nightgown so they could search her body for gun shot wounds.⁸⁴ In the summer of 1980, Federal agents and local police maintained intense surveillance of a Brooklyn community center called "the Armory," which housed several grassroots programs including Uhuru Sasa (Kiswahili for Freedom Now) school, one of the premier Black nationalist freedom schools in the United States. Due to its long history and community support, police officials were hesitant about raiding the Armory.⁸⁵

⁸¹ Reverend Herbert Daughtry, "Run Hard Sister, Run Hard," *Amsterdam News* 70:48 (December 1, 1979), p. 17.

⁸² The Black Community, "Peace to Assata Shakur," *Amsterdam News* 71:1 (January 5, 1980), p. 5.

⁸³ Hill, *op. cit.*, p. 72; "A Chronology of Key Events, 1979-1982," *New Afrikan Freedom Fighter* 2:1 (1983), p. 6; Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

⁸⁴ "A Chronology of Key Events, 1979-1982," *op. cit.*, p. 6; Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 176.

⁸⁵ Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

To collaborate more efficiently, the FBI and New York police decided to form the Joint Terrorist Task Force (JTTF), which would serve as the coordinating body in the search for Assata and the renewed campaign to smash the BLA.⁸⁶

In the midst of the JTTF campaign to capture Assata, during November of 1980, the hunted BLA soldier herself released a taped message from clandestinity. This message was played at community programs and grassroots public affairs radio shows across the United States. The message, titled "From Somewhere in the World," detailed acts of White supremacist violence which had occurred in the United States in 1979 and 1980. Due to those acts of violence Assata concluded:

Our backs are up against the wall and more than any time of our history ... of being captives in America, we need an army... to defend ourselves and to fight for our liberation.⁸⁷

She also thanked "the many sisters and brothers who have opened their doors" to her after her liberation from captivity. She described those who offered refuge to her as part of the "underground railroad."⁸⁸

In response to the new wave of repression, Black activists organized a campaign to challenge the JTTF's counter-insurgency efforts and win support for the Black underground, particularly for Assata Shakur. On July 18, 1981, the National Committee to Honor New Afrikan Freedom Fighters mobilized 1000 people to the first New Afrikan Freedom Fighters Day. The purpose of New Afrikan Freedom Fighters Day was to honor Assata Shakur and the Black Liberation Army.⁸⁹ Throughout Black sections of New York "Assata Shakur is Welcome Here" posters were plastered in visible outdoor spaces and hung in homes.⁹⁰

The Revitalization of the Armed Struggle

On October 20, 1981, an incident occurred that eventually revealed that a significant resurgence of BLA activity had occurred within four years of police claims of the revolutionary organization's demise. Three White revolutionaries—Judy Clark, David Gilbert and Kathy Boudin—and one Black man with radical associations, Solomon Brown, were arrested in the aftermath of an attempted holdup of a Brinks armored truck and a subsequent shootout at a police road block in Rockland county, New York. Several Black men escaped the scene of the shootout. The holdup and shootout resulted in the death of one Brinks guard and two police officers.⁹¹ The JTTF immediately followed a trail of physical evidence which led them to members of the Black underground. On October 23, 1981, in the Queens section of New York City, police pursued two Black men they suspected being involved in the Rockland holdup. A shootout between the police and the Black men ensued, resulting in the death of one of the men,

⁸⁶ "A Chronology of Key Events, 1979–1982," *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁸⁷ Assata Shakur, *From Somewhere in the World: Assata Shakur Speaks to the New Afrikan Nation* (New York: New Afrikan Womens Organization, 1980), p. 10.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

⁸⁹ "A Chronology of Key Events, 1979–1982," *op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁹⁰ Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 179.

⁹¹ "A Chronology of Key Events," *op. cit.*, p. 6; John Castelucci, *op. cit.*, pp. 3–21.

Mtayari Shabaka Sundiata, and the capture of the other, Sekou Odinga. Odinga, the former Bronx BPP section leader, had been a fugitive since January of 1969 on charges related to the New York Panther 21 case. After his capture, Odinga was taken to a police precinct where he was tortured to extract information from him concerning the Black underground and the whereabouts of Assata Shakur. Police beat and kicked Odinga, burned his body with cigars, removed toenails from his body, and forced his head into a toilet bowl full of urine, repeatedly flushing the toilet. Throughout the torture, Odinga defiantly remained silent. As a result of this brutality, Odinga's pancreas was severely damaged and the Black revolutionary had to be fed intravenously for three months.⁹²

In the days, weeks, and months following Odinga's capture several others, including many former members of Panther chapters, were arrested by the JTTF and others were forced underground. By the end of November 1982, several members of the New York Panther chapters including Kuwasi Balagoon, Abdul Majid, Jamal Joseph, Bilal Sunni Ali, and New Jersey Panther Basheer Hameed were all captured and charged with acts linked either to the events on October 20, 1981 in Rockland county, or other expropriations and suspected BLA activity. Members of the Provisional Government of the Republic of New Afrika, including Mutulu Shakur, Nehanda Abiodun, and Fulani Sunni Ali, were also charged with acts related to BLA activity.⁹³ Abiodun was forced underground and surfaced in Cuba in 1994. The Cuban government granted Abiodun political asylum. Criminal charges were dropped against Fulani Sunni Ali when it was proved she was in New Orleans during the October 20, 1981 incident in Rockland, New York. Even after being cleared of criminal charges, Sunni Ali and several others were interned in a federal prison for refusing to testify to a federal grand jury investigating their friends and comrades in the movement.⁹⁴ Besides Clark, Gilbert, and Boudin, other Whites were subsequently arrested and charged, including Silvia Baraldini and Marilyn Buck. Baraldini, an Italian national, was active in solidarity efforts among White anti-imperialists with the New Afrikan and Puerto Rican movements.⁹⁵ Buck had been underground since 1977, and she was charged and convicted of purchasing ammunition for BLA members.⁹⁶ Many other White anti-imperialists were also interned by the federal grand jury for refusing to testify against the BLA and the New Afrikan and anti-imperialist movement.

On November 5, 1981, members of the Black Liberation Army issued a communique to put into political context the events in Rockland county and the subsequent arrests. The October 20, 1981 holdup was described as an

⁹² Williams, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-79; "A Chronology of Events," *op. cit.*, p. 6; Castellucci, *op. cit.*, p. 237; "BLA Trial," *Death to the Klan: Newspaper of the John Brown Anti-Committee 4* (Fall 1984), pp. 8-9.

⁹³ "A Chronology of Events," *op. cit.*, pp. 6-7.

⁹⁴ "Fulani is Free!," *New Afrikan: Organ of the Provisional Government of the Republic of New Afrika* 9:3 (December 1983), p. 5; Fulani Sunni Ali, "Black People, My People! My Name is Fulani-Ali," *Arm the Spirit: A Revolutionary Prisoners Newspaper* 14 (Fall 1982), p. 6.

⁹⁵ Silvia Baraldini, "Silvia Baraldini: Italian National Political Prisoner," in *Can't Jail the Spirit: Political Prisoners in U.S.* (Chicago: Editorial El Coqui Publishers, 1988), pp. 143-44.

⁹⁶ "Marilyn Buck," in *Can't Jail the Spirit, op. cit.*, pp. 151-53.

"expropriation," the seizure of property by political or military forces.⁹⁷ One BLA member defined expropriation as "(W)hen an oppressed person or political person moves to take back some of the wealth that's been exploited from him or taken from them."⁹⁸ The BLA communique stated that the attempted expropriation was the responsibility of the Revolutionary Armed Task Force (RATF), a "strategic alliance ... under the leadership of the Black Liberation Army" of "Black Freedom Fighters and North American (White) Anti-Imperialists."⁹⁹ The Whites in the RATF not only participated in armed actions, but infiltrated rightwing and White supremacist organizations to gain information for the BLA.¹⁰⁰ This alliance was racially diverse and politically diverse. The RATF included underground fighters who identified themselves as revolutionary nationalist, Muslim, anarchist, or communist under the leadership of clandestine forces from the New Afrikan Independence movement.¹⁰¹ This ideologically diverse alliance came together in response to an escalation of acts of White supremacist violence in the United States during the late 1970s and early 1980s, including the murders of Black children in Atlanta, Black women in Boston, the shooting of four Black women in Alabama, and the acceleration of paramilitary activity by the Ku Klux Klan and other White supremacist organizations. According to the communique, the RATF initiated a "decentralized intelligence strategy" to establish the strength and capability of White supremacist paramilitary forces and their networks which extended into the US military, as well as federal, state, and local police forces. The RATF believed this White supremacist upsurge was connected to rightwing and pro-fascist financial and political elites. Through expropriations from American capitalist financial institutions, the RATF hoped to acquire the resources needed to support a resistance movement to oppose the rightwing, White supremacist upsurge. The RATF planned to "accumulate millions of dollars under the political control of ... revolutionary elements" to establish self-defense units and community cultural, health, and educational institutions in Black communities throughout the United States. Due to the political character of the actions of the RATF, the communique stated "[T]he comrades who are in jail are not criminals. They are Prisoners of War ... They are heroes struggling against RACISM, FASCISM, AND IMPERIALISM."¹⁰² Supporters of the defendants in these cases argued that proceeds from the expropriations were being used for "the maintenance of the Army and certain other causes." These causes included grassroots youth, community health programs, and political mobilizations. Movement literature also stated proceeds

⁹⁷ Black Liberation Army communique, "On Strategic Alliance of the Armed Military Forces of the Revolutionary Nationalist and Anti-Imperialist Movement," in Imari Abubakari Obadele (ed.), *America The Nation-State: The Politics of The United States From A State-Building Perspective* (Baton Rouge: The Malcolm Generation, 1998), pp. 423-24.

⁹⁸ Acoli, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

⁹⁹ BLA communique, "Strategic Alliance of Armed Military Forces," p. 423.

¹⁰⁰ "Inside the Brink's Story: A War of National Liberation Disclosed," *New Afrikan: Organ of the Provisional Government of the Republic of New Afrika* 9:3 (1983), p. 6.

¹⁰¹ "Freedom Fighters: Profiles of Struggle," *New Afrikan Freedom Fighter* 2:1 (1983), p. 8. This article profiles BLA soldiers Sekou Odinga and Kuwasi Balagoon and RATF members Judy Clark and David Gilbert. It is an indication of the varied political perspectives in this armed alliance.

¹⁰² BLA communique, "Strategic Alliance of Armed Military Forces," p. 423.

were contributed to African liberation movements, particularly the struggle against settler colonial rule in Zimbabwe.¹⁰³

The JTTF and federal prosecutors determined that the Rockland county incident was a part of a series of several expropriations by the BLA and its White allies from 1976 until December of 1981. Besides the New York state criminal charges related to the RATF expropriation in Rockland county, federal prosecutors charged several captured revolutionaries and political activists with RICO (Racketeer-Influenced Corrupt Organization) act conspiracy charges originally designed for the Mafia and other criminal organizations. Charges related to the liberation of Assata Shakur and the providing of refuge to BLA and the RATF were also linked to RICO conspiracy charges.

While not pleading guilty to participation in any particular act, in their legal defense, Sekou Odinga and Mutulu Shakur (in two separate trials) argued that the acts of the BLA and RATF, including expropriations and the liberating of Assata Shakur, were political acts, not criminal offenses. Since the BLA units involved in the RATF were committed to fighting for an independent New Afrikan nation, Odinga and Shakur argued these acts were actions of a national liberation movement. The two New Afrikan liberation fighters and their legal defense teams argued that under international law, these actions of combatants of a national liberation movement should be tried by an international tribunal, not domestic criminal courts.¹⁰⁴

The investigations of the JTTF led to three separate trials. Balagoon, Clark, Boudin, and Gilbert were convicted by a Rockland county jury on murder and armed robbery charges for the October 20, 1981 expropriation by the RATF. Federal prosecutors held two federal RICO conspiracy trials. In the first, the defendants were charged with 28 counts of criminal conduct. After a five-month trial, a jury of eight Blacks and four Whites returned not guilty verdicts on 22 of the 28 counts. Bilal Sunni Ali was acquitted of all charges in the RICO conspiracy case. In the same case, Joseph and former PGRNA worker Chui Ferguson were acquitted of racketeering conspiracy, murder, and robbery charges, but convicted of acting as accessories. Odinga and Baraldini were acquitted of robbery and murder, but convicted of racketeering and racketeering conspiracy. Federal judge Kevin Duffy sentenced Odinga and Baraldini to 40-year sentences.¹⁰⁵ In the second RICO trial, Marilyn Buck and Mutulu Shakur, captured in 1985 and 1986, respectively, were convicted of federal racketeering conspiracy, murder, and armed robbery. New York federal judge Charles Haight sentenced Buck and Shakur to 50 and 60 years, respectively.¹⁰⁶

While federal prosecutors acknowledged Odinga was not a part of the events

¹⁰³ Afoh *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 43. "Sekou Odinga: I Am a Muslim and a New Afrikan FreedomFighter," *New Afrikan: Organ of the Provisional Government of the Republic of New Afrika* 9:3 (1983), p. 4.

¹⁰⁴ Umoja, "Set Our Warriors Free," pp. 429-31; "Memorandum from Dr. Mutulu Shakur to Judge Charles Haight" (November 26, 1987); *United States of America v. Mutulu Shakur* (defendant), United States District Court Southern District of New York, Affidavit 3 sss 82 Cr. 312 (CSH).

¹⁰⁵ "In US-Brinks' Trial New Afrika Wins!," *New Afrikan: Organ of the Provisional Government of the Republic of New Afrika* 9:3 (1983), p. 3.

¹⁰⁶ "Marilyn Buck," *op. cit.*, p. 153; Chokwe Lumumba, interviewed by author (November 22, 1998), Jackson, MI.

at Rockland county, they viewed the Black revolutionary as the leader of the BLA units responsible for organizing the RATF. Odinga, who escaped a police raid attempting to capture him in 1969, was granted political asylum by the Algerian government in 1970 and served as a member of the International Section of the BPP. Federal investigators estimate Odinga reentered the United States in around 1973. A profile on Odinga in movement literature asserts "(I)n the mid-1970s, Sekou returned to the US to organize ... and help to build the Black Liberation Army."¹⁰⁷ During the period that federal and local police believed they had destroyed the BLA, Odinga and other Black revolutionaries rebuilt the capacity of the BLA as an effective radical underground network. The focus of the "revitalized" BLA units during this period (1976–1981) was different from the BLA of the post-BPP split period (1971–1975). The emphasis in the first period seemed to be retaliation against police, the occupying army of the colonized nation. In the second period, the primary focus of BLA operations seemed to be the development of the infrastructure of the armed clandestine movement and support for aboveground institutions, organizing, and mobilization.

The BLA and the Legacy of the Black Panther Party: The Struggle Continues

The BPP participation in the BLA demonstrates clearly that there were multiple responses to repression by Party leaders and rank-and-file membership. The Oakland-based BPP led by Huey Newton determined it was necessary to subordinate BPP's association with armed struggle and emphasize community service programs and participation in the electoral arena. Other BPP factions believed that due to the intense repression against the BPP and the Black liberation movement, it was necessary to go underground and resist from clandestinity through the vehicle of the BLA. Possibility the most important issue was not whether the BPP emphasized a reformist or radical agenda in response to counter-insurgency, but its inability to maintain its organizational unity and cohesiveness in the face of repression.

After the split in the BPP, several BPP members joined the ranks of the BLA. While the BLA may have predated the BPP, the influence of the BPP on its ranks cannot be denied. Party members who went underground saw themselves continuing the revolutionary agenda of the BPP from clandestinity. The radical expression of the BPP through the BLA has a history as long as the Oakland-based BPP, if not longer. Scholars of the BPP argue the organizational expression of the BPP continued until June 1982. This is the year the last program of the BPP in Oakland, the Oakland Community School, closed. According to the JTTF, the last *known* action of Panthers involved in the BLA was in December of 1981, six months prior to the closing of the Oakland Community School. Even in captivity, captured BLA members continue to forward political agendas consistent with their involvement in the BPP. For example, in November of 1993, former BPP members and associates, including Jalil Muntaqim, Sekou Odinga, Sundiata Acoli, geronimo ji Jaga and Mutulu Shakur, made a call to revolutionary nationalist organizations, collectives, and individuals to form a New Afrikan

¹⁰⁷ "Sekou Odinga," in *New Afrikan Freedom Fighter* (March 1983), p. 8. Castellucci, *The Big Dance*, pp. xiv, 71. According to Castellucci, Odinga rented a safehouse in Pittsburgh in January of 1974. If this is true, one can assume he was in the United States in 1973.

Liberation Front (NALF).¹⁰⁸ After months of dialogue and debate, inspired by the call of the prisoners, seven revolutionary organizations united to form the NALF.¹⁰⁹ In 1997, from prison, former Panther and BLA member Jalil Muntaqim made a call for "Jericho 98," a march and rally demanding amnesty for political prisoners in the United States.¹¹⁰ On March 27, 1998, the NALF and the PGRNA-sponsored Jericho 98, mobilizing 5000 people, the largest demonstration in the United States for the freedom of political prisoners. Despite incarceration, death, and exile, the revolutionary legacy of the Black Panther Party and Black Liberation Army continues.

¹⁰⁸ Sekou Odinga, Hanif Shabazz Bey, Mutulu Shakur, Kojo, Jalil Muntaqim, Jihad Mumit, Sundiata Acoli, and Geronimo ji Jaga, "Statement in Support of Consolidation from New Afrikan POWs and Political Prisoners in Lewisburg, New York, and California Prisons: Toward the Objective of Building a National Liberation Front," in *The Jericho Movement*, commemorative newspaper for the March 27, 1998 march in Washington, DC, p. 3. This statement was originally drafted by New Afrikan political prisoners and BLA members in the federal prison in Lewisburg, PA and endorsed by political prisoners in other locations. Its initial circulation was in November of 1993.

¹⁰⁹ "Kansas City Summit: NALF Work Summation," in founding documents of *New Afrikan Liberation Front* (August 1994).

¹¹⁰ Jalil Muntaqim, "From Jericho to New Jerusalem," *The Jericho Movement*, p. 4.